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THE UNAVAILABILITY OF RELIGIOUS ARGUMENTS 
OMRI BEN-ZVI* 
ABSTRACT 
Religious arguments, i.e. normative arguments that rely on premises re-
garding God's commands, routinely figure in legal and public debates. For 
example, they recently played a public role in the debate on same-sex 
marriage that ensued after the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. 
Hodges. However, philosophers are bitterly divided on the question of 
whether such arguments are permissible in a liberal democracy. In this Ar-
ticle, I offer a novel rationale for excluding several prominent sub-groups 
of religious arguments from the public sphere, including from legal argu-
mentation. While most philosophers address this issue as a question of 
political philosophy, I develop an account of religious arguments that 
draws on theories of practical reasoning. The Article argues that, appear-
ances notwithstanding, many types of religious arguments do not provide 
standard, run-of-the-mill reasons for action in the same way that (for ex-
ample) utilitarian or deontological arguments do. In fact, when examined 
closely, they are revealed to be internally incoherent. The Article thus 
shifts attention away from political philosophy, where both parties to the 
debate on religious argumentation have found inconclusive support for 
their positions, and focuses instead on practical reasoning theories. Ana-
lyzing religious arguments in this way shows that there is a fundamental 
tension between religious argumentation and the way we conduct practi-
cal and legal reasoning. This tension makes it hard to take religious ar-
guments seriously qua arguments and consider them in a political or legal 
scenario. The upshot is that many religious arguments are revealed to be 
internally incoherent, and therefore unavailable to participants in legal 
and policy discussions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that a supervisor in the Kentucky Ministry of Education one day de-
cides that all public schools in her jurisdiction must openly exhibit a copy of the 
Ten Commandments on the wall of each classroom. Assume that the relevant 
state rules do not conclusively specify the considerations the supervisor may rely 
upon when making regulatory decisions in these circumstances. When pressed for 
the reasoning behind her decision, the supervisor explains that according to her 
Christian faith, she is under a divine duty to do all she can so that children under 
her supervision learn the Ten Commandments by heart.1 Is such a decision justi-
fied in a liberal democracy? Note that in answering this question, we may not 
simply allude to the fact that the religious supervisor's reasoning is in tension with 
the Establishment Clause.2 The reason for this is that this response relies on a con-
stitutional norm that is specific to the United States but may not apply elsewhere 
(in Europe, for example).3 Relying on the Establishment Clause thus leaves the 
more basic question unanswered: is there something other than a contingent legal 
rule (albeit a constitutional one) that explains the fundamental problem with the 
religious supervisor's decision?4 
Most theorists address this issue as a question of political philosophy. They 
ask whether citizens in a liberal democracy owe a “duty of civility” towards others 
and argue about whether such a duty prevents citizens with religious outlooks 
from advancing theological arguments.5 In this Article, I offer a different view, 
based on an account of religious arguments that draws on theories of practical 
reasoning. My argument challenges a common assumption both sides to the de-
bate make, namely that religious arguments provide standard, run-of-the-mill rea-
sons for action in the same way that (for example) utilitarian or deontological ar-
guments do. I show that many (though not necessarily all) religious arguments are 
in fact internally incoherent, and therefore do not really support any concrete pol-
icy or outcome. 
                                                                
 1. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 4042 (1980). In Stone, the Court struck down a statute 
that required the posting of the Ten Commandments in public classrooms because it lacked a nonreligious 
legislative purpose and was therefore in violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 4243. 
  2. Id. at 42. 
 3. See, e.g., Lautsi v. Italy, 54 Eur. Ct. H.R. 60 (2011) (where the European Court of Human 
Rights upheld a decision to fix a crucifix to the wall of each public-school classroom in Italy); Perry Dane, 
Foreword: On Religious Constitutionalism, 16 RUT. J.L. & REL. 460 (2015); see generally Andrea Pin, Public 
Schools, the Italian Crucifix, and the European Court of Human Rights: The Italian Separation of Church and 
State, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 95 (2011).  
4. On the unique encounter between law and religion in such settings, see Perry Dane, Master 
Metaphors and Double-Coding, 53 SAN DIEGO. L. REV. 53 (2016). 
 5. See infra Section III.A. 
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This conclusion bears on legal reasoning in a particular way, specifically by 
limiting the forms of discourse that may permissibly be used in constitutional ad-
judication. I thus propose a unique constraint on the establishment of religion: 
whatever else the state may or may not do in matters of church and state, I main-
tain that there is a certain manner of reasoning it may not employ. This constraint 
derives from practical reasoning—religious arguments are disqualified not be-
cause they breach a “duty of civility,” but because they are lacking as arguments. 
This conclusion should thus stand on its own, regardless of whether or not one 
accepts the controversial philosophical thesis of “public reason,” i.e. the idea that 
some forms of reasoning do not respect secular citizens and should, therefore, be 
banned. 
The upshot is that religious adherents cannot ground their legal claims by al-
luding to religious arguments. This is an important restriction, as many religious 
followers express their views in exactly this way, and theorists have struggled to 
explain why such claims cannot receive substantial legal weight. The Article offers 
a new rationale for explaining a key feature of modern constitutional adjudication, 
as I show below. 
The argument proceeds as follows: in Section II, I make several observations 
about the scope of the argument and the terms used in the Article. Sections IIIIV 
then offer my central thesis: Section III develops a justification for excluding reli-
gious justifications, based on theories of practical reasoning; and Section IV shows 
that while religious arguments are defined rather narrowly throughout the discus-
sion, the justification for excluding them applies to other major cases of religious 
argumentation. If this thesis is plausible, then many (though not all) religious ar-
guments ought to be excluded from the public sphere, for reasons that have more 
to do with practical reasoning than with a duty of civility. I have no remaining 
complaints against religious arguments that survive my criticism. Section V ex-
plores how my thesis bears on legal reasoning: I argue that my view leads to a 
restriction on introducing religious arguments in constitutional adjudication. A 
short conclusion follows. 
II. SCOPE AND PRELIMINARY COMMENTS 
This section sets the stage for the philosophical argument that is presented 
below. First, note that one may plausibly consider vastly different types of argu-
ments as “religious,” and it would be unwise to oversimplify matters by assuming 
that all religious arguments are alike.6 To avoid making ungrounded assumptions, I 
employ a piecemeal approach—I start by identifying a group of examples that 
clearly fall under most plausible definitions of the term, and use this group as a 
rough first estimate of what a religious argument is. The discussion (up until sec-
tion IV) thus concentrates on arguments for a specific outcome that rest on as-
sumptions about God’s commands, as understood by the Scriptures or through 
                                                                
 6. See generally KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988) [hereinaf-
ter GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS]; Jeremy Waldron, Two-Way Translation: The Ethics of Engaging 
with Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation, 63 MERCER L. REV. 845 (2012); ROBERT AUDI, RATIONALITY 
AND RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT (2011) [hereinafter AUDI, RATIONALITY AND RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT]; Andrew F. 
March, Rethinking Religious Reasons in Public Justification, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 523 (2013). 
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interpretation of other religiously significant documents.7 In the cases I am inter-
ested in, God's commands both constitute and exhaust our reasons for action, and 
settle our practical dilemmas completely—they "throw the last stone," as William 
James has put it.8 
It should be noted that this type of argument is of central importance in law, 
religion, and morality. First, it is historically quite popular among the three West-
ern religions.9 Modern philosophers of religion have also claimed that variants of 
this view underlie the belief structure of most of Western theology.10 Second, it is 
also closely related to a moral theory known as Divine Command Morality 
(“DCM”).11 DCM scholars all agree that there are no moral standards other than 
God's will: without God's commands, nothing would be right or wrong.12 Finally, 
this position is regularly brought up in public debates (though it is far from the 
only argument religious citizens rely on). For example, both the majority and mi-
nority opinions in Obergefell v. Hodges note that religious claims of this sort ani-
mate much of the controversy regarding same-sex marriage, as many opponents 
of same-sex marriage believe that this practice is a sin against God.13 Therefore, to 
the extent that my argument works, it is directly relevant to many actual theologi-
cal positions. 
                                                                
 7. See CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL POLITICS 71 (2002); Daniel Statman & 
Gideon Sapir, Is a Liberal State Permitted to Act on the Basis of Religious Arguments, 25 MECHKAREI MISHPAT 
599 (2009) (Hebrew) [hereinafter Statman & Sapir, Religious Arguments]; DANIEL STATMAN & GIDEON SAPIR, 
STATE AND RELIGION IN ISRAEL: A PHILOSOPHICAL-LEGAL INQUIRY 66–68 (2014) (Hebrew) [hereinafter STATMAN & 
SAPIR, STATE AND RELIGION IN ISRAEL]. 
 8. WILLIAM JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE, HUMAN IMMORTALITY, AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR 
PHILOSOPHY (1956). 
 9. In Christianity, they are attributed to Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Martin Luther, John 
Calvin, and possibly John Locke and William Paley, to name a few. In Islam, they form the theological basis 
for the influential Ash’ari school, and they have also been accepted, to some degree, by prominent Jewish 
thinkers throughout history: Rabbi Ovadiah of Bertinoro, Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Levin, Rabbi Abraham Isaiah 
Karelitz (‘Hazon Ish’), Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Immanuel Jakobovits, Marvin Fox 
and Aharon Lichtenstein. See generally, John Hare, Religion and Morality, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. ARCHIVE, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/religion-morality/ (last modified Oct. 1, 2010); Thom-
as M. Osborne Jr., Ockham as a Divine-Command Theorist, 41 RELIGIOUS STUD. 1 (2005); George F. Hourani, 
Two Theories of Value in Medieval Islam, 50 MUSLIM WORLD 269 (1960); Richard M. Frank, Moral Obliga-
tion in Classical Muslim Theology, 11 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 204 (1983); Steffen A.J. Stelzer, Ethics, in 161 THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO CLASSICAL ISLAMIC THEOLOGY (Tim Winter ed. 2008); MARIAM AL-ATTAR, ISLAMIC ETHICS: 
DIVINE COMMAND THEORY IN ARABO-ISLAMIC THOUGHT (2010); see also MICHAEL J. HARRIS, DIVINE COMMAND ETHICS: 
JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES 36–50, 110–20 (2003). 
 10. See generally J.L. Schellenberg, Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion, 66 INT’L J. PHIL. 
RELIGION 113 (2009). 
 11. See, e.g., Hare, supra note 9; DIVINE COMMANDS AND MORALITY (Paul Helm, ed., Oxford Uni-
versity Press 1981); Thomas V. Morris & Christopher Menzel, Absolute Creation, 23 AM. PHIL. Q. 353 
(1986); AVI SAGI & DANIEL STATMAN, RELIGION AND MORALITY (1995) [hereinafter SAGI & STATMAN, RELIGION AND 
MORALITY]; PAUL ROONEY, DIVINE COMMAND MORALITY (1996); Mark C. Murphy, Divine Command, Divine Will, 
and Moral Obligation, 15 FAITH AND PHIL. 3 (1998); ROBERT MERRIHEW ADAMS, FINITE AND INFINITE GOODS: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR ETHICS (2002); JOHN E. HARE, GOD AND MORALITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY (2007).  
 12. See note 11 and accompanying text. 
 13. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct 2584 (2015). Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court: 
“Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable 
religious or philosophical premises . . . ” Id. at 2602; Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting: “Many good and 
decent people oppose same-sex marriage as a tenet of faith.” Id. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see 
generally Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147 (2015). 
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With that, I do not argue that this sub-group of cases represents the com-
mon structure of religious arguments—it stands on its own as a unique variant of 
religious discourse that does not typify other theological positions. I only argue 
that my chosen sub-group of cases is paradigmatically religious; and that argu-
ments of this kind do actually get brought up in public debates. Section IV general-
izes these assertions by making similar claims regarding other sub-groups of reli-
gious argumentation, e.g. arguments in which God acts as an epistemic authority, 
and arguments in which other, independent normative factors may outweigh 
God's commands. 
Restricting ourselves to arguments that refer to divine commands in this way 
limits the scope of the thesis in several respects. First, I presuppose a Western 
conception of religion, and a particular view of the connection between religion 
and God. Therefore, the argument does not apply to religions that operate differ-
ently (i.e. Buddhism). Second, I assume that a religious argument is a practical 
argument that has religious content. Third, I am not concerned with arguments 
from religious feelings or from autonomy, since such justifications are really 
straightforward arguments from moral or legal rights. Lastly, throughout the dis-
cussion, I assume a “clean case” of religious argumentation: a scenario in which an 
agent only offers a single, religious justification for action. I assume that only after 
we understand them in their “pure” form can we decide how to treat religious 
arguments when we encounter them in practice. Thus, if they truly are incoher-
ent, they should just drop out of the argumentative equation. When this happens, 
it might be the case that other reasons for action that support the same outcome 
as the discarded religious argument are strong enough to win the day on their 
own, but that is largely immaterial for this investigation. 
The second major term I use throughout the discussion, “public sphere,” de-
notes the space in which we generally use arguments for and against the applica-
tion of organized state power by government officials, through the various mech-
anisms the state operates. The Kentucky example discussed above is a good ex-
ample of such a case. I do not examine whether it is permissible for a private citi-
zen to rely on religious arguments in private matters, or for a legislator to vote on 
a piece of legislation based on preferences alone, though the argument does apply 
to private citizens debating questions of public policy, as well to the judiciary. 
III. A PROPOSED RATIONALE FOR EXCLUDING RELIGIOUS ARGUMENTS 
The problem of religious argumentation has received two distinct answers. 
The first view (“The Exclusion Approach”) holds that it is impermissible to use reli-
gious justification to ground state action.14 Theorists who take the opposing posi-
tion (“The Inclusion Approach”) try to show that there is nothing wrong with using 
religious arguments in the public sphere.15 
                                                                
 14. See infra Section III.A. 
 15. See infra Section III.A. 
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A. The Political Rationale for Excluding Religious Argumentation 
The argument for the exclusion approach usually starts with the assumption 
that a liberal state should respect its citizens’ autonomy.16 This obligation entails 
that we should only use state power according to reasons that are in line with 
what Kant, and Rawls after him, called “public reason.”17 More recently, philoso-
phers tend to put this point in terms of a “duty of civility” that each citizen has 
towards her fellow citizens.18 This duty restricts the types of justification that one 
can offer in public matters, sometimes to the point of excluding some or all reli-
gious arguments.19 Obviously, the first major concern for the exclusion approach is 
to explain exactly why civility requires that we refrain from using religious argu-
ments. For this purpose, exclusionists usually introduce a principle (an “exclusion 
principle”) that performs three tasks: 
(1) It identifies a certain attribute, or group of attributes that arguments 
usually have, and maintains that they are essential for all acceptable ar-
guments in the public sphere; 
(2) It explains why these attributes are of fundamental importance; 
(3) It shows that some arguments (among them religious arguments) lack 
all, or some of these attributes, and therefore are not to be allowed into 
public discourse.20 
Many exclusionists have tried to form an exclusion principle that meets 
these specifications.21 Rawls, for example, thought it inappropriate to rely on any 
form of argument that could not be accepted by all “reasonable citizens.”22 Ac-
cording to Audi, one should refrain from using arguments that cannot be tolerated 
by a “rational citizen,” defined as a citizen with regular mental capacities and all of 
the relevant information regarding the decision to be made, unless one can pro-
vide supporting, secular reasons for his position.23 And finally, Nagel’s suggested 
exclusion principle focuses on a desired epistemic quality that arguments pos-
sess.24 He argued that we shouldn't allow arguments that lack “common grounds 
                                                                
 16. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, 14142 (1995). For different justifica-
tions, see Jonathan Quong, On the Idea of Public Reason, in 265 A COMPANION TO RAWLS (J. Mandle & D. 
Reidy eds., 2013) (These other accounts also lead to the same normative conclusions). 
 17. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES: WITH “THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED” 5458 (1999). 
 18. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 6; EBERLE, supra note 7. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 17; Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and 
Democratic Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677, 679–85 (1993) [hereinafter Audi, Democratic Society]; ROBERT 
AUDI, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 40 (2011) [hereinafter AUDI, DEMOCRATIC 
AUTHORITY];  Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 230 (1987) 
[hereinafter Nagel, Moral Conflict]; see also NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 16, at 154–68.  
 21. For a fuller analysis of these attempts, see EBERLE, supra note 7, at 198–234. See also Ulf 
Zackariasson, A Critique of Foundationalist Conceptions of Comprehensive Doctrines in the Religion in 
Politics-Debate, 65 INT’L J. PHIL. RELIGION 11 (2009). 
 22. See RAWLS, supra note 17, at 17778. 
 23. Audi, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY, supra note 20; Audi, Democratic Society, supra note 20. 
 24. Nagel, Moral Conflict, supra note 20, at 228–30; NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 
16, at 154–68. 
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of justification”—i.e. arguments that we can’t “reasonably reject” on a joint inter-
subjective basis—into public deliberation.25 More specifically, Nagel thought that a 
proper argument should always be open to future modification on the basis of 
criticism, and that arguments should only be based on grounds that are publicly 
accessible.26 
Although very different, all exclusion principles purport to exclude religious 
arguments (though some of them also exclude certain non-religious justifications 
as well). This is not logically necessary—there is nothing in the concept of an ex-
clusion principle that requires it to exclude religious arguments. And yet, as one 
inclusionist, Christopher Eberle, ironically states: “[A] necessary condition of the 
adequacy of any conception of public justification is that it gives the result that a 
religious rationale is insufficient for a public justification[.]”27Many inclusionists 
challenge the exclusionist project precisely on this point and argue that most ex-
clusion principles do not in fact show that religious arguments are problematic. 
Regardless of whether this criticism is correct, it is worth considering the fact 
that the exclusion approach offers a way to explain our intuitive hesitation to al-
low religious arguments into the public sphere. It seems hard to deny the strength 
with which this intuition grasps us (at least in the group of cases I am interested 
in—recall the example in the Introduction), and so it would be wise to give it close 
attention before concluding that it is mistaken. 
However, this type of justification has also been subject to much criticism. I 
discuss three problems, in particular, below. 
(1) Exclusion principles tend to exclude too many core forms of argumenta-
tion out of the public sphere.28 They are thus too strong to be effective in a liberal 
society—the criterion might exclude religious arguments at the cost of also reject-
ing most other common forms of argument. Eberle attributes this problem to 
Rawls,29 and he seems to be making a valid point: Why should reasonable citizens 
agree on any major form of argumentation? In assessing this issue, it is important 
to remember that Rawls himself is famous for arguing that citizens can reasonably 
disagree on “comprehensive doctrines.”30 Under Rawls' view, then, as long as even 
a small sub-group of reasonable citizens do not accept a type of argument, that 
type ought to be banned from the public sphere. This solution seems to leave us 
with little to work with in public debates. 
(2) Many exclusion principles are too weak to work properly—they fail to 
show that there is anything wrong with religious arguments. Needless to say, this 
is antithetical to the whole project of formulating an exclusion principle in the first 
place. Audi and Nagel seem to suffer from a combination of this problem and the 
first objection, at least on some (plausible) interpretations of them. Audi doesn’t 
clarify what he means by a “rational citizen.” Under a lenient definition of “ration-
                                                                
 25. NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY, supra note 16, at 161. 
 26. Id. at 158. 
 27. See EBERLE, supra note 7, at 205. 
 28. See id. at 204. 
 29. Id. at 214–16. 
 30. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 184 (2001). 
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al,” it is banally true that religious arguments are also to be considered rational.31 
And if we opt for a stricter conception of rationality, Audi will have to explain why 
secular arguments, even those that can employ highly controversial normative 
notions, pass the rationality test, whereas religious arguments do not. This is not a 
simple objection to meet—there is no such obvious explanation, and Audi indeed 
does not offer one.32 
The same could be said of Nagel’s use of the “public accessibility” standard. 
What exactly does Nagel mean by “a more impersonal standpoint”? Does the 
“more” in “more impersonal” actually mean complete? Under this rather strict 
reading of Nagel, the first problem returns, because we acknowledge only argu-
ments that others can understand objectively. There is evidence that Nagel want-
ed to defend such a position,33 but as he himself observes (in other contexts), we 
can never completely “exit” our subjective point of view, since trying to achieve 
complete objectivity undermines our very nature. Arguments that are valid from 
an objective point of view are scarce, if they exist at all.34 If, however, we relax the 
impersonality condition, the second worry returns—how impersonal should we 
go, and why is it that only religious arguments fail this test? Thus some substan-
tive work needs to be done to show that there exists a level of impersonality that 
religious arguments alone cross. This further important step in the argument can-
not be found in Nagel's comments on the matter, and indeed it is hard to figure 
out how to go about demonstrating this.35 
(3) The last hurdle for exclusionists concerns the justifications for the exclu-
sion principles themselves. The inclusion camp argues that the very idea of such a 
principle assumes that liberal theory stands on a “higher plane” than competing 
views, while it is actually just another normative theory, which should not be enti-
tled to any special epistemological privileges. Nagel sees this as a “suspicion” re-
garding exclusion principles,36 but for Larry Alexander, it is not a suspicion but a 
reality, as “liberalism and religion are on the same epistemological level,” and 
therefore “liberalism must establish its tenets by rejecting conflicting religious 
ones, not by the illusion of ‘neutrally’ banishing them to the ‘private’ realm, where 
they can somehow remain ‘true’ but impotent.”37 This objection is not easy to 
discharge. How can the exclusion approach neutrally explain its use of an exclu-
sion principle? And if exclusionists admit to using a normative standard, why 
should we allow this first-order normative position to exclude other first-order 
                                                                
 31. See Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious Arguments 
Should be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 639, 654. 
 32. See Statman & Sapir, Religious Arguments, supra note 7, at 611. 
 33. See Nagel, Moral Conflict, supra note 20, at 229 (Arguing that “On the view I would de-
fend, there is a highest-order framework of moral reasoning . . . which takes us outside ourselves to a 
standpoint that is independent of who we are. It cannot derive its basic premises from aspects of our 
particular and contingent starting points within the world . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 34. See THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 210 (1986). 
 35. See Nagel, Moral Conflict, supra note 20, at 229. 
 36. See id. at 235–37 (emphasis added). 
 37. See Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
763, 789–90 (1993); see also Ronald Dworkin, Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy, 
24 OXFORD J.  LEGAL STUD. 1, 9 (2004).  
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normative positions, on account of some unexplained resort to second-level neu-
trality? If the inclusion approach is correct in this point, the appeal to neutrality 
collapses to a first-order viewpoint regarding the good, which we have no neutral 
reason to accept. 
It seems, then, that the philosophical debate regarding religious arguments 
is at an impasse, at least as far as the project of justifying exclusion is concerned. 
In light of the these difficulties, I now turn to propose a new conceptualization of 
the problem, and consequently, a new solution. 
B. The Proposed Exclusion Principle 
Let me first give a rough first sketch of my view. My exclusion principle in-
cludes a normative and a conceptual premise. Normatively, I maintain that one 
ought to use the coercive force of the state only on the basis of what one believes 
to be an “all-things-considered” reason for action, i.e. a conclusive reason that 
derives from the process of practical reasoning (although one does not have to go 
through the process of practical reasoning oneself). The conceptual part of the 
exclusion principle is more complex. I argue that practical reasons must conceptu-
ally take the form of potentially-inconclusive considerations—reasons for action 
that could, in principle, be defeated (or 'Pro Tanto' duties). This entails the toning 
down constraint: Toning down an argument means treating it as only pro tanto 
true, even if it was submitted as conclusive. 
The amalgamation of these claims is that reasons for action that refuse to be 
toned down cannot, conceptually, count as valid outcomes of practical reasoning 
(because of the conceptual premise), and therefore should not be used in the pub-
lic sphere (because of the normative premise). This poses a unique problem for 
religious arguments, but not for many other types of arguments—because reli-
gious arguments become incoherent when subjected to the toning down con-
straint. The exclusion principle thus presents a two-pronged dilemma for religious 
arguments: either become toned-down and incoherent, or reject the toning-down 
constraint and remain out of the public sphere. 
All this needs further explanation. I first address the merits of the conceptual 
premise, and return to the normative component later. 
The conceptual premise asserts that religious arguments—but not other 
normative arguments—become internally incoherent when toned down. My ar-
gument for this conclusion draws on the famous distinction between “All Things 
Considered” (“ATC”) and “Pro Tanto” (“PT”) duties. Explaining this point requires 
elaborating on theories of practical reasoning, but the digression is necessary. 
On the standard account of practical reasoning, a result (X) is “ATC required” 
if, after reviewing all relevant factors, X is indeed called for.38 On the other hand, X 
is only “PT required” if there is some factor that leads to accepting X.39 Other con-
siderations might outweigh those in favor of X, but it is still true that X is at least 
                                                                
 38. See infra note 40. 
 39. See infra note 40. 
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PT required.40 Thus, one can come to the conclusion that an “ATC argument” (an 
argument with an ATC duty as its conclusion) is correct only after reviewing all 
relevant factors.41 However, the introduction of a “PT argument” (an argument 
with a PT duty as its conclusion) says nothing of other possibly relevant considera-
tions.42 
Practical reasoning, as usually construed, thus involves moving from PT ar-
guments to ATC conclusions.43 The way to do this is to measure all contradicting PT 
reasons. Philosophers believe that reasons for action have a dimension of weight, 
and that considering conflicting reasons for action amounts to ascertaining which 
reason, or group of reasons, outweighs the rest.44 For example, by promising to 
meet a friend for lunch I create a PT reason to keep my promise. But if on the way 
I encounter a situation in which I can help save a person's life (with little risk to 
myself), this establishes a second, contradicting reason to act, assuming I cannot 
do both things. I thus should compare my reasons to act and see which one out-
weighs the other. In this example, I should arguably break my promise and try to 
save the person's life. 
We can now understand the logic behind the toning down constraint: If prac-
tical reasoning consists of weighing conflicting reasons until one reaches an ATC 
conclusion, that entails that before an ATC conclusion is reached, we can only ac-
cept PT reasons as “input.”45 Toning down an argument means conceptualizing it 
in a way that makes it possible to inquire whether it is in fact outweighed or oth-
erwise defeated by other reasons for action.46 
For example, consider the view that what I ought to do in the example above 
is keep my promise, period—no other considerations are relevant. There is obvi-
ously some truth in this claim, which stems from the fact that I do have a reason—
a PT reason—to keep my promise. But the argument is presented as an ATC con-
clusion, and therefore what I ought to do is tone it down, by retaining the core of 
the argument (the reason to keep the promise) but labeling it differently—as a PT 
reason that could, conceptually, be outweighed. This doesn't mean that it is al-
ways outweighed or otherwise defeated in fact, but only that the duty to keep my 
promise is defeatable. 
This account of practical reasoning is surely partial. For reasons of space, I 
cannot address all the nuances of this framework, but it would help to show that 
                                                                
 40. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 27 (2nd ed. 2002) [hereinafter RAZ, 
PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS]; see generally Henry S. Richardson, Moral Reasoning, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. 
ARCHIVE, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasoning-moral/ (last modified Oct. 1, 2013). 
 41. This should not be read to endorse any constructivist account of practical reasoning. My as-
sertion here only pertains to the logical difference between PT and ATC duties. See generally John Rawls, 
Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515 (1980). 
 42. See generally RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 40. 
 43. See JOSEPH RAZ, ENGAGING REASON: ON THE THEORY OF VALUE AND ACTION 22–23 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2003). 
 44. I will assume here that such measuring is possible and that incommensurability is not an 
unresolvable difficulty. See, e.g., Ruth Chang, All Things Considered, 18 PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 12 
(2004). 
 45. Exclusionary reasons are also PT reasons in this respect, since one has to check whether 
other exclusionary reasons exist. 
 46. Chang, supra note 44.  
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many ordinary arguments can be explained as practical arguments. Consider these 
examples: 
(a) Rules and second-order reasons: many norms are not weighed against 
competing reasons for action but rather constrain the first-order process 
of practical reasoning itself, by functioning as exclusionary reasons.47 An 
exclusionary reason is a reason to avoid relying on a certain reason for 
action in the first-order reasoning process just described.48 For example, 
adopting a “five-mile run on Mondays” rule means that I don't have to 
always measure all contradicting reasons to go out for a run every Mon-
day. Instead, the rule excludes reasons to stay at home—it gives me a 
reason not to rely on those reasons—and leaves only the reasons I have 
for going for the run in the first place. But even when second-order rea-
sons are present, deciding what one ought to do entails considering the 
relative weight of the reasons for action that have not been excluded—
practical reasoning always ends with a first-order process of moving from 
PT arguments to an ATC conclusion.49 This is true even if, after some rea-
sons for action have been excluded, we can only identify one remaining 
reason (the process would then end quickly, of course).50 
(b) Lexical priority: some believe that certain values enjoy lexical priority 
over others.51 When value X has lexical priority over value Y, X will always 
come out ahead of Y, no matter how weighty they are in a given situa-
tion.52 But even values that have lexical priority over others are consid-
ered PT reasons.53 In fact, this must be assumed in order to make sense 
of the notion of lexical priority: Lexical priority is a way of moving from PT 
arguments to ATC conclusions—in this case, without checking the 
strength of the reasons.54 To see this more clearly, consider the fact that 
values that are lexically superior are sometimes defeated themselves, i.e. 
by arguments of the same lexical type that are weightier. For example, 
Rawls claims that certain liberties enjoy lexical priority over other princi-
ples of justice, but adds that conflicting claims can be founded on these 
liberties.55 When this happens, the lexically-superior claims must be 
                                                                
 47. RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS, supra note 40, at 40. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See infra note 52. 
 52. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 838 (1863) (“Few human creatures would con-
sent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast’s pleas-
ures.”). 
 53. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 37–39 (revised ed., 1999) (characterizing principles 
that have lexical priority as defeating other PT arguments but “avoids . . . having to balance  
principles  . . .”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 214. 
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weighed to see which one prevails (using Rawls' principles of measure-
ment).56 
(c) Particularly strong reasons for actions: some believe that certain ac-
tions should never be committed, e.g. the state ought never to torture.57 
Assuming for a moment that this is correct, the argument against torture 
should still be conceptualized as a PT argument that becomes an ATC 
conclusion when no defeating considerations apply. For why is it the case 
that the state should never torture? To answer this question, some rea-
son has to be supplied. Call this reason T, and assume for the sake of ar-
gument that T indeed justifies the “no-torture” rule. What this means is 
that T outweighs or otherwise defeats other contradicting reasons for ac-
tion. For example, T might include an exclusionary reason that supports 
it, or it might have lexical priority over other reasons, etc. But this is con-
sistent with, and presupposes that, T had to be conceptualized as a PT 
reason for action before it became our ATC conclusion. Arguing for T as-
sumes the very normative playground in which T interacts with other rea-
sons for action, and supposedly defeats them. And this is even if, for rhe-
torical purposes, it is stated in unequivocal terms. 
We see, then, that the framework of practical reasoning is flexible enough to 
accommodate many different modes of inquiry. In addition—and this point is 
highly important—both sides to the debate (i.e. exclusionists and inclusionists) use 
the language of practical reasoning in order to explain their positions. For exam-
ple, Eberle states that a citizen “ought to pursue rational justification for the claim 
that her coercive actions are morally appropriate, all things considered[,]”58 and 
other inclusionists seem to agree.59 Inclusionists, by their own lights, only care 
about the ability to rely on specific reasons for action that will defeat others, and 
not about actual outcomes. This means that by thinking about this problem 
through practical reasoning theories we are not prejudicing against the inclusion 
camp, but in fact only making explicit what both sides to the debate already as-
sume is the case. 
C. The Toning Down Constraint and Religious Arguments 
The toning down constraint begins to explain the problem with religious ar-
guments. These arguments are presented as ATC conclusions, and should there-
fore be toned down. However, this is a unique case in which toning the arguments 
                                                                
 56. Id. at 220; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 289–96 (expanded ed., 2005). 
 57. See, e.g., Michael Davis, The Moral Justifiability of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or De-
grading Treatment, 19 INT’L J. APPLIED PHIL. 161 (2005); David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking 
Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425 (2005). 
 58. EBERLE, supra note 7, at 91. I take Eberle’s argument to be that even when one cannot find a 
secular argument to present, she still has a duty to remain within the confines of practical reasoning, 
albeit by only using religious arguments. 
 59. See, e.g, Alexander, supra note 37; Statman & Sapir, Religious Arguments, supra note 7, at 
604; WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 109 (1991); 
STATMAN & SAPIR, STATE AND RELIGION IN ISRAEL, supra note 7, at 69.  
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down would render them internally incoherent, for reasons that are explained 
shortly. 
Why are religious arguments presented as ATC arguments? The reason is 
simple. Recall that in Section II, I explain that for the time being, I am only inter-
ested in cases in which God's commands constitute and exhaust the moral realm. 
An objection might be raised that other ways of defining religious arguments are 
conceptualized differently. I respond to this claim in length in Section IV, by dis-
cussing various other definitions of religious argumentation and showing that the 
exclusion principle applies to them as well. For now, let us focus on the first sub-
group of religious arguments, which is presented in the form of an ATC conclu-
sion—arguments of this type seem to settle the normative question entirely. 
But why is toning down a religious argument especially problematic? To ex-
plain this fundamental issue, consider these two examples of arguments that 
ought to be toned down: 
(i) Christina argues that we ought to perform X, because X-ing conforms 
with God's commands. 
(ii) Harry argues that we should perform Y, on strict utilitarian grounds 
(that is, Harry believes that reasons of utility are the only ones that 
count). 
I maintain that though Christina's argument becomes internally incoherent 
when toned down, Harry's argument remains consistent. And this is the point in 
the debate in which I take a different path than those who discuss religious argu-
mentation from a point of view that is informed by a duty of civility. I focus not on 
the relationship between Christina and her fellow citizens, but on her argument 
for X-ing itself. The only question I ask is whether Christina's argument actually 
supports X. In this way, I wish to sidestep the difficult moral question of identifying 
the counters of Christina's duty of civility towards other citizens. If Christina's ar-
gument is incoherent, no evaluation of her position vis-à-vis political morality is 
required. A religious agent's duties towards other citizens in regards to a religious 
argument she endorses are only relevant to the extent that the agent's argument 
is actually coherent (that is, that it is an actual argument). Therefore, my thesis 
should stand regardless of the truth or falsity of any theory on a duty of civility or 
“public reason.” 
Let us, then, consider Christina's argument. She believes (1) that God's 
commands constitute and exhaust our reasons for action; and (2) that God com-
manded us to X. To that we should now add, taking into account our practical rea-
soning framework, that (3) Christina's argument is a PT argument and that it 
could, conceptually, be defeated. That is, even if Christina is completely correct 
about (1)–(2), some other reason or group of reasons might in principle outweigh 
or otherwise defeat her proposed reason for action. Again, I am not arguing that 
Christina's argument is in fact defeated; for my exclusion principle to work, it is 
enough to admit of the possibility of such an occurrence. 
Once these assumptions are spelled out, Christina's account starts to lose its 
internal coherence. The reason is this: Christina's argument is grounded on a the-
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ology that posits God as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.60 Omnibe-
nevolence—the property of being perfectly good—implies that “it is metaphysical-
ly impossible that these two concepts, being (morally) obligatory and being in ac-
cord with God’s will for (morally appraisable) actions of created beings, not apply 
to the same deeds.”61 This creates a problem for Christina, since it means that 
assumption (1) implicitly entails the impossibility of what assumption (3) hypothe-
sizes is possible. 
In other words, the fact that God is perfectly good means that whatever He 
commands must be what we ought to do, all things considered—God's command 
cannot be true but inconclusive (otherwise, God could not be characterized as 
perfectly good). And yet this theological assumption contradicts assumption (3). 
The upshot is that the argument itself is incoherent, and as a result cannot count 
as a reason for X-ing. 
Now, recall Harry's argument in favor of Y-ing. This argument should also be 
toned down, with the result being roughly that while Y-ing promotes utility, there 
could in principle be other, more pertinent duties that are relevant. This argu-
ment, I contend, is clearly still coherent. There is no problem with treating reasons 
from utility as PT reasons. 
And this brings us to the heart of the matter. Why does Christina's theologi-
cal argument break down, while Harry's utilitarian argument remains coherent? 
The reason is that there is a difference between Harry and Christina's foundational 
argumentative structures. Harry may continue to hold on to the positive part of 
his argument (that utilitarian concerns support Y-ing) even when he admits that 
some other reasons might outweigh the one he put forward, because there is 
nothing in the value of well-being, on which Harry's argument relies, that logically 
entails the exclusion of other forms of value. In other words, the assumption that 
well-being is valuable does not mean that only well-being is valuable. Thus, we can 
coherently consider well-being to be valuable and entertain other, independent 
and contradicting reasons for action. 
But things are different with Christina's religious argument. For omnibenevo-
lence—the assumption that God is perfectly good—logically entails both (i) that 
His commands constitute reasons for action and (ii) that only His commands do so. 
Christina is committed to a theological assumption about the completeness of the 
source of value she has identified, that Harry does not share. The Western con-
ception of God includes the hypothesis that He is perfectly good, and that in turn 
means that whatever He commands must conform perfectly to what we should 
do, all things considered. That is not the case with other conceptions of value, 
such as well-being or even deontological duties.62 This difference makes it easy to 
                                                                
60.  See AUDI, RATIONALITY AND RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT, supra note 6, at 192.  
61.  Id. at 145 (emphasis in the original).  
62.  I take modern deontological theories to specify certain restraints or permissions on human 
behavior, which apply regardless of consequences. Many deontological theories also claim that moral 
restraints are categorical. This additional claim cannot be derived from the concept of a deontological 
restraint. It has to be defended on independent grounds. To claim otherwise is to deny that the many 
deontological theories that acknowledge consequentialist reasons for action are coherent. See Larry Alex-
ander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/ethics-deontological/ (last modified Dec. 12, 2012). 
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tone down utilitarian arguments but presents a unique challenge to religious 
claims. 
D. The Normative Assumption 
Consider this objection to my view: people often bring up what seem to be 
religious claims, and the conceptual hypothesis only implies that these instances 
are not really cases of using practical reason. But why should that matter? Here, 
the normative assumption is helpful: It asserts that one should only base (and 
propose to base) state action on ATC reasons for action, i.e. reasons that derive 
from the practical reasoning process. Note that the justification for this view is not 
grounded in political values. As Raz explained, we should be guided by ATC rea-
sons for action because reasons for action provide us with all the normative justi-
fication we have for acting in a certain way, and an ATC reason for action just is 
the reason we find most compelling.63 Many inclusionists understand this implicit-
ly, as I state earlier. 
It is important to stress that the normative premise is consistent with the 
state making a mistake in the reasoning process, or with citizens finding more rea-
sons for action that bear on the question at hand after the state has made up its 
mind. In addition, the normative premise posits only that one should rely on ATC 
reasons for action, and not that one should always go through the process of prac-
tical reasoning oneself. 
Armed with these insights, we may now formulate exactly what is wrong 
with using religious arguments in the public sphere. The problem is that they re-
fuse, so to speak, to participate in the process of practical reasoning. And yet they 
are being used, rhetorically, to make it seem as if state action is based on a rea-
soning process that generated a coherent ATC conclusion. Under this explanation, 
religious arguments only appear to result from a move from PT considerations to 
ATC conclusions. To fully participate, the religious argument must be conceptual-
ized as a PT consideration, but that would cause it to become incoherent. When 
one insists on submitting an un-toned-down religious argument, then, she is simp-
ly using an incoherent argument under the guise of furthering discussion. And 
when one relies on such an argument, she is not really participating in the argu-
mentative process as we understand it. Her actions have certain outcomes, and 
they look from the outside as a result of deliberation, but there really was no co-
herent deliberation involved. 
IV. THE EXCLUSION PRINCIPLE AND OTHER RELIGIOUS ARGUMENTS 
The discussion so far neglected what is arguably the biggest potential prob-
lem for the thesis—the fact that the exclusion principle relies on a rather narrow 
definition of religious discourse. To remedy this, I show in this part that even if we 
relax our working definition of a religious argument, the exclusion principle, or 
something close to the exclusion principle, still gives us strong normative reasons 
to exclude several groups of religious arguments from the public sphere. I examine 
                                                                
 63. Joseph Raz, Incorporation by Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 1, 2 (2004). 
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these types of arguments, which might be considered religious, but fall outside of 
the scope of the definition I put forward in Section II. My aim in this is not to 
demonstrate that every candidate for a religious argument is excluded by the ex-
clusion principle; the point is only to show that many other plausible accounts of 
religious arguments suffer from problems similar to those the exclusion principle 
identified. The exclusion principle is thus helpful in explaining one major difficulty 
with religious arguments, even when that category is understood more broadly. 
Let us return to Christina's argument for X-ing. Christina now tries a different 
strategy, arguing that God's role in supporting X-ing is in fact not normative but 
epistemic. In this formulation, God's commands act as epistemic guides to doing 
the right thing, but do not constitute reasons for action themselves. The reasons 
for X-ing are other-worldly and we, being the small, narrow-minded creatures that 
we are, cannot correctly identify them. Consequently, we must rely on God's 
commands to comply with what reason demands of us. In philosophy of religion, 
this move is known as Skeptical Theism64, and I believe it is not a good way out of 
the problem. 
A crucial argument made by skeptical theists is that we should always re-
serve judgment about whether God has reasons for action that are unknowable to 
us—"When it comes to good and evil, we do not know how much we do not 
know."65 The point is not that God has reasons beyond our ken, but that we could 
not know them, if he had them. But as critics of Skeptical Theism persuasively ar-
gue, accepting this argument would have disastrous effects on our ability to make 
any sort of practical decision at all.66 Skeptical theism rests on the assumption that 
we should never move from (a) “these are all the reasons for action that I can 
identify” to (b) “these are all the reasons for action there are” (supposedly, be-
cause other reasons beyond our understanding might also exist). The problem is 
that all of us, including self-proclaimed skeptical theists, make that sort of move 
all the time; without it we would be unable to decide how to behave. How can we 
decide which car to buy, how to spend our afternoon, whether or not to go to 
college, etc., if we can't ever reach an ATC conclusion? 
More worryingly, we would forever be morally paralyzed, unable to decide 
whether to intervene even when we see the most troubling acts performed.67 For 
example, even if Christina believes that one should never commit murder because 
God so commanded, she might still wonder whether this attempted murder she is 
now witnessing, and can prevent, is overall justified for reasons beyond her ken. 
After all, perhaps God has reasons to allow this act, perhaps this is not murder in 
the divine sense. Without direct divine guidance on any specific policy or outcome 
(which, unfortunately, we do not have), it seems that a skeptical theist should 
                                                                
64.  Justin P. McBrayer, Skeptical Theism, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 
https://www.iep.utm.edu/skept-th/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2018). 
65.  Erik J. Wielenberg, Sceptical Theism and Divine Lies, 46 RELIGIOUS STUD. 509, 510 (2010). 
66.  McBrayer, supra note 64. 
 67. See Michael J. Almeida & Graham Oppy, Sceptical Theism and Evidential Arguments from 
Evil, 81 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 496, 505 (2003); Michael J. Almeida & Graham Oppy, Evidential Arguments 
from Evil and Skeptical Theism, 8 PHIL. 84 (2005); Stephen Maitzen, The Moral Skepticism Objection to 
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always wonder whether in the specific situation she is in, God might have reasons 
beyond our understanding that would make what seems like a good result be-
come actually bad, or vice-versa. We quickly see that such global skepticism con-
tradicts the very foundations of practical reasoning to which Christina must still be 
committed, since she aims to have argument admitted into the public arena. 
Another possibility, closely related to Skeptical Theism, but slightly different, 
is advocated by Statman and Sagi.68 They argue that we only have non-theological 
reasons for action, but that we need God to show them to us, since man is limited 
in his epistemic capacities.69 This time, it is not that we lack knowledge about the 
nature of other-worldly reasons, but that we do not know how to properly weigh 
this-worldly reasons for action. 
Unfortunately, this view is susceptible to the difficulties that plague skeptical 
theism. In fact, I believe it actually fares worse. Take, for example, God's com-
mand to the Israelites in Deuteronomy 25:19, to kill all Amalekites without preju-
dice (“you shall blot out the name of Amalek from under heaven”).70 Now, I think 
that we know relatively well what normative reasons one might have to perform 
mass-murder of this kind, and they are very weak, to say the least. And yet, ac-
cording to Sapir and Statman, if we think the Israelites should not have wiped out 
another ethnic group, it is only because we are confused about the relative weight 
of the reasons we recognize. Therefore, we should be skeptical about our ability 
to deliberate in these matters. But this pretty quickly leads to a more global skep-
ticism about practical reasoning in general, and that position is clearly rejected by 
the considerations I discuss above. If I do not really know why one should avoid 
mass-murder (as I was given at least one example in which I was clearly mistaken), 
then it can only be because the general reasons for action that I usually recognize 
don't add up like I think they do. Therefore, it seems I know very little of reasons 
and their weight in general. 
The example itself, it should be noted, does not really matter. All that mat-
ters is that many allegedly divine commands show us that we do not weigh rea-
sons for actions correctly. This would imply a sort of mysticism and a denounce-
ment of practical reason that contradicts the very act of offering rational argu-
ments in normative matters. It should also be noted that even Statman and Sagi 
eventually do not endorse this position: They conclude their study by stating that 
Jewish policy makers “exercise their autonomous judgment and . . . rely on their 
own understanding, including moral understanding, when dealing with the prob-
lems before them.”71 The upshot is that the exclusion principle's underlying ra-
tionale provides a normative reason to avoid religious arguments, even when 
God's contribution to the argument is understood in epistemic terms. 
At this stage another possibility might present itself to Christina. She might 
argue that a religious argument is based on independent, this-worldly reasons for 
action, but that weighing different conflicting reasons is accomplished through the 
                                                                
 68. See Avi Sagi & Daniel Statman, Divine Command Morality and Jewish Tradition, 23 J. 
RELIGIOUS ETHICS 39, 44 (1995). 
 69. See id.; SAGI & STATMAN, RELIGION AND MORALITY, supra note 11, at 88. 
 70. Deuteronomy 25:19 (New International Version). 
 71. Sagi & Statman, supra note 68, at 60. 
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framework of understanding what God commands (e.g. “the fact that X-ing max-
imizes utility is a sign that God commands us to X, for God commands to promote 
utility”). A religious argument is thus the product of a line of reasoning that starts 
with PT arguments, and God only commands what is independently good. 
While this option offers an interesting way to accommodate independent 
reasons for action under a religious framework, it is also in tension with the exclu-
sion principle's understanding of practical reasoning. Under Christina's new expla-
nation, we would expect our secular ATC conclusions to be almost identical with 
what God commands. But that, of course, is not the case. God does not simply 
demand: “Do the right thing, all things considered.” This is very evident if we con-
sider paradigmatic examples of divine commands: God commanded Abraham to 
sacrifice Isaac,72 not go up mount Moriah and do the right thing, all things consid-
ered. Similarly, the divine command expressed in Deuteronomy 25: 19 is to kill all 
Amalekites, not to consider all relevant factors and then treat the Amalekites ac-
cordingly (again, one may come up with many other examples). In other words, 
simply insisting that these divine commands are really the result of an interpretive 
method that weighs all PT reasons for action will not work without some sort of 
global skepticism. 
Finally, what if conforming to God's commands is a second-order rule? After 
all, Christina does not simply weigh God's commands in every concrete case; ra-
ther she just follows what might seem like a general rule, without considering eve-
ry case on its merits. 
Unfortunately, it is hard to understand the duty to conform to God's com-
mands as a rule, at least under the ordinary understanding of what rules are and 
how they operate. A rule is usually thought of as a generalization that is some-
times over-inclusive and at other times under-inclusive in relation to a certain ra-
tionale (i.e. the rule helps us reach the correct decision most of the time, but not 
always).73 The motivation for adopting a certain rule—the reason we are justified 
in doing so—is that adopting the rule will on average lead to making better deci-
sions, as we are unable to reach the right decision in every case (because of time 
constraints, or the complexities of real-life situations etc.). Now a divine rule—an 
“always follow God's commands” rule—is different in one respect: It stands to 
reason that this rule will always lead to the correct result. After all, that is the 
whole point of positing an infallible, all-powerful, all-knowing God who issues 
rules and commands. And yet this line of thought leads us back to Skeptical The-
ism, which the exclusion principle rejects. Take the biblical example we already 
mentioned, that of a divine command to sacrifice your child. How is following 
God's commands, based on the “follow God's commands” rule, supposed to lead 
to the right ATC conclusion in this case? We already know that one can find very 
little to support sacrificing one's child on one's own, and just telling us that the 
“follow God's commands” rule will lead to the right decision doesn't seem to help. 
It must be that there are other reasons for action that make following the rule 
                                                                
 72. Genesis 22: 2–8. 
 73. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED 
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acceptable. But we don't know them. So our only way forward is to assume that 
they are beyond our ken, or that their relative weight is foreign to us. 
V. THE EXCLUSION PRINCIPLE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 
Assuming that the foregoing discussion establishes the validity of the exclu-
sion principle, how does this result affect legal—and more specifically, constitu-
tional—discourse? In answering this question, I want to remain neutral vis-à-vis 
the particulars of any given constitutional regime. My thesis does not hinge on the 
details of the Establishment Clause, or on any other specific legal instrument for 
regulating the dynamics of church and state.74 Therefore, although I use mostly 
American examples, I do not intend to make a U.S-specific claim (however, I do 
restrict the discussion to liberal democracies). 
Applying the exclusion principle to law means that we may now justify a limit 
on the forms of legal discourse that may be used to discuss issues in which religion 
plays a part. More specifically, religious adherents ought not to support their 
claims by alluding to religious arguments in the sphere of law. This imposes a 
heavy burden on citizens with religious outlooks, as many of them wish to rely on 
straightforward religious arguments, instead of policy considerations or human 
rights claims. 
An additional claim I make in this Section is that this normative constraint on 
adjudication is already de facto accepted in many legal systems, though its justifi-
cation is seldom discussed. By this I mean that many courts already exclude reli-
gious arguments from deliberation, using a variation of the toning down con-
straint I explain above. Thus, courts do not conceptualize “pure” religious argu-
ments (i.e. arguments from divine command) as arguments at all, and treat them 
as foreign to the legal system. 
In order to enter the legal sphere, religious arguments need to be translated 
to PT claims, such as arguments from policy (i.e. religious feelings), rights (i.e. 
freedom of religion), democracy (i.e. the need to debate the issue further), etc. 
These new arguments are translated in the sense that they keep a sociological 
connection to religion—they are sensitive to concerns that many religious citizens 
deeply care about. But their fundamental argumentative structure is vastly differ-
ent, as they can now be toned down without difficulty. Without alluding to the 
exclusion principle, inclusionists will find it hard to justify this fact about adjudica-
tion in liberal democracies. 
The upshot is that my thesis offers a new philosophical justification for a 
practice we already accept, but cannot currently explain. I defend these two asser-
tions below. 
A. The Exclusion Principle and Legal Reasoning 
Legal reasoning is, arguably, a subclass of practical reasoning—it shares prac-
tical reasoning's basic conceptual architecture while adhering to additional princi-
                                                                
 74. For a discussion of religious establishment in Europe, see Joseph H. H. Weiler, Freedom of 
Religion and Freedom from Religion: The European Model, 65 ME. L. REV. 760 (2013). 
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ples.75 Therefore, it stands to reason that if an argument fails to present a sound 
practical reason for action, it should not be construed as giving a legal reason for 
action as well (although the opposite does not necessarily apply—not all sound 
practical arguments can be used in legal reasoning).76 Consequently, accepting the 
exclusion principle means banning religious arguments from legal discourse. 
To explain how this constraint works, imagine that religiously-inclined citi-
zens desire that the state accept rule R. When R becomes a matter for legal dis-
cussion (i.e. when some aspect of R is brought up in legal proceedings), one may 
raise several types of arguments in favor of it. For example: interpretative claims 
(law, properly understood, demands that R be implemented); policy considera-
tions (R is efficient); human rights claims (including, but not restricted to, freedom 
of religion); reasons that relate to the “nature of democracy” (i.e. the need to sus-
tain a public debate regarding R's merits); or straightforward religious reasons of 
the sort discussed in Sections II-IV. Of course, this account is highly schematic, and 
it avoids many intricate issues. For instance, some of these arguments can be con-
nected in complicated ways, e.g. interpretative claims sometimes hinge on policy 
or human rights considerations. 
Nevertheless, for our purposes it is sufficient, for it makes clear that the ex-
clusion principle effectively prohibits reliance on the latter type of argument, 
while allowing any other non-religious argument to count in favor of adopting R. 
My thesis thus leaves ample room for legal debate, while denying religious partic-
ipants of one central technique for supporting their claims. 
Unlike other limits on establishment of religion, this constraint only applies 
to how the state may reason; it remains neutral regarding what it ultimately can 
and cannot do.77 However, adopting this constraint may affect the substantive 
debate in two ways. 
First, excluding religious reasons from legal reasoning denies religious citi-
zens a central form of expression in legal debates. Many religious citizens are very 
sympathetic to straightforward religious claims, as I show in Section II.78 The core 
of religious practice, at least for some, is performing certain acts, and avoiding 
others, simply because they accord with or contradict God's commands. Of course, 
citizens would still be permitted to articulate what seems like religious argu-
ments—they enjoy the right to free speech—but their formulations would not be 
deemed as arguments, i.e. as providing courts with reasons to act.79 In addition, 
                                                                
 75. See JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION 203 (2009); SCHAUER, supra note 73, at 
20, 22; LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING 3 (2008); NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC 
AND THE RULE OF LAW:  A THEORY OF LEGAL REASONING 1315 (2005). 
 76. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, VOLUME 2: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 
520–24 (2008) (discussing the notion of “law as an illustration of public reasons”). 
 77. Id. at 507. 
 78. And indeed, following Obergefell, “It is . . . in the area of religious practice and belief that 
the Court’s decision is likely to raise the most significant legal disputes.” Donald H.J. Hermann, Extending 
the Fundamental Right of Marriage to Same-Sex Couples: The United States Supreme Court Decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 49 IND. L. REV. 368, 381 (2016). See also Stephen M. Feldman, (Same) Sex, Lies, and 
Democracy: Tradition, Religion and Substantive Due Process (with an Emphasis on Obergefell v. Hodges), 
24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 341 (2015). 
 79. See Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2061, 
2063 (1992) (book review). 
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religious citizens could still raise other sorts of arguments in support of their posi-
tion (as I discuss infra). 
The second implication of excluding religious argumentation from the legal 
sphere is narrowing religious citizens' potential sphere of influence. It is common 
wisdom that courts are major cultural agents—they are theaters of debate in 
which citizens discuss the most heated and controversial issues of their day, in-
cluding issues of church and state, and their decisions on how these matters affect 
society in dramatic ways.80 Denying religious argumentation entry into legal rea-
soning means that at least some views receive diminished support in this im-
portant institution. 
B. Religious Arguments and Legal “Translation” 
Though seemingly reformist, the suggestion to ban all religious argumenta-
tion from legal reasoning actually coheres well with established legal practices in 
many liberal states. Steven Smith refers to this phenomenon as the “de facto dis-
establishment.”81 As he notes, “there is little evidence of religious ideas in the typ-
ical lawyer's brief or judicial opinion.”82 The lack of religious argumentation in legal 
reasoning is fairly obvious,83 but is rarely justified.84 Therefore, my thesis is im-
portant in justifying a prevalent, but little-understood phenomenon. 
As most jurists in liberal democracies would agree, “we do not expect to see 
[religious arguments] in judicial opinions.”85 Arguments from God's commands are 
not usually brought up by litigators and are not endorsed in judicial opinions, and 
religious citizens must find different ways of supporting their claims.86 In other 
words, a straightforward religious claim (“we should enact R because God com-
mands us to do so”) cannot be toned-down, as is explained in Section III.87 Conse-
quently, it is excluded by many courts.88 But descriptive claims (“the Framers be-
lieved that God commanded them to act in accordance with R”), comparative 
claims (“R is accepted in the Mexican and Norwegian legal systems, as well as in 
Jewish law”), and rights claims (“I have a constitutional right to act in accordance 
                                                                
 80. My point here is descriptive—I am only arguing that many courts do function in this way.    
 81. Steven D. Smith, Legal Discourse and the De Facto Disestablishment, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 203, 
20304 (1998). 
 82. Id. at 213. 
 83. See, e.g., GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 6, at 239; Scott C. Idleman, The 
Role of Religious Values in Judicial Decision-Making, 68 IND. L. J. 433, 442 (1993); Richard Garnett, A Hands-
Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What are We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 842 (2008). 
 84. See Smith, supra note 81, at 218; SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: RELIGIOUS 
VOICES AND THE CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA 3–4 (2010). 
 85. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS, supra note 6, at 239. 
 86. GORDON, supra note 84, at 3. 
 87. See Adam Shinar & Anna Su, Religious Law as Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 
11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 74, 98 (2013). 
 88. See id. Shinar & Su discuss briefly the possibility of using religious arguments as “persuasive 
authority” directly. Id. They agree this is a possibility but cannot offer one actual example of such a use. Id. 
at 98100. 
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with R”)—are routinely used.89 And note that they are all classic PT arguments that 
may be outweighed and negated.90 
I think it is best to see these sorts of arguments as translations of religious 
claims, which themselves cannot participate in legal discourse. I use the word 
“translation” to express a loose sense of continuity between the straightforward 
religious arguments and their variations: both claims share a sociological connec-
tion to religion (e.g. they are routinely endorsed by religious believers).91 Howev-
er, descriptive, comparative, and rights claims are not ordinary translations in the 
sense that their argumentative structure is vastly different than the religious ar-
gument. 
Thus, the exclusion principle is helpful in understanding the mechanism 
through which modern courts adjudicate religious arguments: Courts (usually) 
adhere to the toning down constraint, and only take into consideration transla-
tions of religious arguments that have a PT structure.92 
The U.S. Supreme Court decision on same-sex marriage provides a good ex-
ample.93 As both the majority and minority opinions in Obergefell v. Hodges con-
cede, straightforward religious claims animated much of the controversy.94 What 
many opponents of same-sex marriage really wanted to say to the Court was that 
this practice is a sin against God.95 And indeed it is clear that the Court's decision 
was interpreted as going against God's commands by at least some religious 
communities.96 But the formal constraints of legal reasoning prevented the Court 
                                                                
 89. For a general discussion of this point in legal reasoning, see Omri Ben-Zvi, Judicial Greatness 
and the Duties of a Judge, 35 L. & PHIL. 615, 62830 (2016). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 212 (2010) (discussing the 
“smuggling” of religious beliefs under the guise of rights-talk). 
 92. Exceptions are very rare. See, e.g., The first Lautsi case, in which the Administrative Tribu-
nal of Veneto employed semi-religious reasoning concerning the sign of the crucifix. TAR Veneto, sez, 
terza, 17 marzo 2005, n. 1110, Foro it. 2005, III, 3, 366 (It.) (referencing. This decision was seen as highly 
controversial and unusual in the Italian legal scene (it “occasioned considerable amusement among con-
stitutional law scholars” in Italy). See Susana Mancini, The Crucifix Rage: Supernational Constitutionalism 
Bumps Against the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 6 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 6, 10 (2010); Pin, supra note 3, at 
97. 
 93. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 94. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 258891, 259293; Perry Dane, A Holy Secular Institution, 58 
EMORY L.J. 1123, 1125 (2009) (arguing that the religious point of view is necessarily relevant for examining 
the institution of marriage). 
 95. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. “Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach 
that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises.” Id. at 2625 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting). “Many good and decent people oppose same-sex marriage as a tenet of faith.” Id. 
 96. See RCA Protests Court Ruling on Same Sex Marriage, RABBINICAL COUNCIL AM. (June 26, 
2015), http://www.rabbis.org/news/article.cfm?id=105821 (Rabbi Leonard Matanky, president of the 
Rabbinical Council of America, stating, “[N]o court can change God’s immutable law.”). See also Statement 
from Agudath Israel of America on the Supreme Court Ruling Regarding Same Gender Marriage, YESHIVA 
WORLD (June 26, 2015), http://www.theyeshivaworld.com/news/headlines-breaking-
stories/322402/statement-from-agudath-israel-of-america-on-the-supreme-court-ruling-regarding-same-
gender-marriage.html (Agudath Israel of America noted in a press release that “The issue is whether the 
Torah sanctions homosexual conduct or recognizes same gender unions. It does not. The truths of Torah 
are eternal, and stand as our beacon even in the face of shifting social mores.”).; Baptists declared “spir-
itual warfare” on the decision, and, as one Reverend said: “We understand how fully unpopular our view 
is, and where the culture is on this issue . . . But we must stay true to God’s word.” Craig Schneider, Bap-
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from addressing such claims directly. The Court only entertained variations of the 
core religious arguments: conceptual reasons and arguments from rights, democ-
racy, and policy. And it found that these reasons are outweighed by the petition-
ers' constitutional rights.97 The point I want to make about this result is structur-
al—the Court simply could not adjudicate the religious arguments that stood at 
the center of the debate themselves, and was forced to address only derivative 
claims that many religious believers did not reach the heart of the matter. The 
exclusion principle justifies this type of approach, as claims from rights, democracy 
or policy are PT translations of religious claims. 
The decision in Obergefell is by no means unique in this regard. For example, 
the Lemon test famously requires a “secular legislative purpose” in cases involving 
alleged infringement of the Establishment Clause.98 And perhaps even more tell-
ing, the Court explicitly notes that “[F]or the adjudication of a constitutional claim, 
the Constitution, rather than an individual's religion, must supply the frame of 
reference.”99 In fact, it seems that straightforward religious claims are, in their 
untoned-down variations, simply alien to the legal system—they are not perceived 
as arguments at all, until they are toned down. Only as PT reasons do they be-
come intelligible subject-matter that the legal system identifies as admissible.100 
For example, in the United States a religious belief does not have to be cen-
tral to the faith, or even valid in itself, to be recognized as religious.101 Indeed, it 
“need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order 
to merit First Amendment protection.”102 These statements reveal much about 
how courts perceive religious discourse: so little is demanded of religious argu-
ments—they need not even be comprehensible (!)—because they are not concep-
tualized as arguments at all, at least not until they are toned-down and become 
arguments from rights, policy, etc.103 It is very hard to imagine a Court treating 
policy considerations similarly (imagine a court saying “a policy argument need 
not be comprehensible…”), because a policy claim is immediately conceptualized 
                                                                                                                                                     
tists Declare ‘Spiritual Warfare’ over Gay Marriage, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (last updated Sept. 23, 2016) (inter-
nal quotations omitted), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/breaking-news/baptist-leader-declares-
spiritual-war-on-gay-marri/nmdn6/. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (i.e. Mormon Church) 
stated that: “The Court’s decision does not alter the Lord’s doctrine that marriage is a union between a 
man and a woman ordained by God.” Supreme Court Decision Will Not Alter Doctrine on Marriage, CHURCH 
JESUS CHRIST LATTER-DAY SAINTS (June 26, 2015), http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/article/supreme-court-
decision-will-not-alter-doctrine-on-marriage. 
 97. I do not mean to suggest that legal reasoning consists of simply taking all considerations in-
to account. Several techniques exist for measuring legal claims, but I will not elaborate on this matter 
here. 
 98. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 99. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 701 n.6 (1986). 
 100. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. “Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach 
that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises.” Id. at 2625 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting). “Many good and decent people oppose same-sex marriage as a tenet of faith.” Id. 
101. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 70203 (1989); Emp’t Div., Dep’t Human Res. Or. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 88687 (1990). 
102. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (emphasis added). Cf. Presbyterian Church 
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 
252, 261 (1982). 
103. See Burwell. v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
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as a PT argument by the court, and PT arguments are always required to be valid 
and sound, and to have normative impact. All this is spared from religious argu-
ments because they are not thought of as arguments at all. 
We see, then, that many courts employ a de facto toning-down constraint: 
They either inspect religious arguments in their “pure” form, in which case they 
remain incoherent beliefs, unavailable for the purposes of adjudication; or they 
translate them into reasons from rights, policy, democracy, etc. These new argu-
ments are then given their proper weight in legal reasoning, but they are markedly 
different from the original religious argument they stemmed from.104 
This conclusion poses a challenge for inclusionists, namely to explain how 
they square their general position in favor of religious arguments with their (ad-
mittedly tacit) agreement to withhold straightforward religious argumentation 
from legal reasoning. If the inclusion approach is correct and religious discourse is 
permitted in the public sphere, why is it that inclusionists (including those who 
specifically discuss legal reasoning) usually do not argue that a jurist may bring up, 
and a judge may decide a case upon a straightforward religious argument?105 
I doubt that the inclusion approach has at its disposal resources to meet this 
challenge. First, it is not enough to state that (say) the Establishment clause for-
bids use of such reasoning. It is not at all clear that it does,106 and moreover the 
norm against straightforward religious argumentation exists in many other legal 
systems that endorse different establishment regimes.107 Inclusionism needs to be 
supplemented with some additional, outside element over and above its core ten-
ets in order to explain this anomaly. This can be done, but only at the cost of cre-
ating inconsistency in the inclusionist approach. Here are several examples of such 
additions, borrowed from the discussion on the limits of establishment. 
Some may argue that endorsement of religious doctrine by the state would 
“corrupt” religion, fearing abuse of state power, unequal treatment or that the 
                                                                
104. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 142 (1995) [hereinafter 
GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES]. 
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maintaining public peace). See, e.g., Bagatz [HCJ] [High Court of Justice] 10356/02 Hass v. IDF Commander 
in the Western Bank, P.D. 58(3) 443 (2004) (Isr.) (constitutional rights); Bagatz [HCJ] [High Court of Justice] 
1890/03 Bethlehem Municipality v. Ministry of Defense, P.D. 59(4) 736 (2005) (Isr.) (constitutional rights); 
Bagatz [HCJ] [High Court of Justice] 5434/96 Horev v. Minister of Transportation, P.D. 51(4) 1 (1997) (Isr.) 
(policy).   
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state will meddle in matters it knows little about.108 Unfortunately, I believe inclu-
sionists cannot adopt this rationale—as they support raising religious arguments 
in many public forums (e.g., the legislator, public officials). If they believe the risk 
of corruption is small in these state endorsements of religion, it is hard to explain 
why the courts should be different. Nor can inclusionists allude to the fear that 
employing religious arguments in legal reasoning would create unnecessary politi-
cal divisions,109 and for the same reason. Inclusionists believe that religious citi-
zens may rely on religious arguments routinely in spite of this worry, and there-
fore they cannot justify a ban on legal reasoning alone.110 Third, the explanation 
that adopting religious reasoning techniques would alienate parts of the popula-
tion111 is also unavailable for inclusionists. For this is what they explicitly deny—
the inclusion approach often claims that turning to religious argumentation does 
not infringe on non-religious citizens' dignity or autonomy (at least in many cas-
es).112 
Finally, Kent Greenawalt argues that judges are under a special duty “to rely 
on arguments they believe should have force for all judges.”113 This explanation 
comes closer to the desired result of banning religious argumentation only in ad-
judication, but notice the ironic reversal of roles: inclusionists are now busy de-
fending exclusion from a certain part of the public sphere, using the exact same 
arguments that exclusionists have employed to justify a broader ban.114 And, cor-
respondingly, Greenawalt's suggestion is troublesome for the same exact reasons 
that inclusionists cite when arguing against the exclusion camp. The main problem 
with this criterion is that because people (including judges) hold divergent ideo-
logical and philosophical positions, employing it could lead to abandoning most of 
our more cherished forms of arguments. It will be enough for even a small group 
of jurists to find a certain form of argument unsatisfactory for it to be excluded.115 
This objection is equally persuasive when the group in question is the judiciary as 
when it is applied to all citizens, and Greenawalt himself admits as much.116 
Thus, we see that it is not easy to accommodate the exclusion of religious 
argumentation from legal reasoning within an inclusionist framework. The reason 
for this is clear: justifying a ban on religious reasoning in law goes against the main 
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inclusionist tendency of opening up public discourse. To be clear, this is only a 
challenge, not a conclusive argument against the inclusion approach. For example, 
one could try to find a better explanation for banning religious arguments from 
adjudication while supporting them in other “public sphere” scenarios. This posi-
tion requires a substantive justification, especially because it seems unattractive 
from an inclusionist point of view. In effect, it means that religious adherents can-
not state what they truly believe in an especially important forum of decision. 
Alternately, inclusionists may take the other prong of the dilemma and demand a 
grand reform in adjudication—a conclusion that requires a strong new argument 
in order to be considered attractive. 
Before concluding, I must admit that my account leaves something to be de-
sired regarding one important normative issue. The problem is this: inclusionists 
argue, plausibly, that excluding their religious views from the public sphere in-
fringes on their dignity—it disregards their strongest beliefs and leave them “si-
lenced and forced to become only truncated selves when they enter the public 
square.”117 It is not that the exclusion principle cannot respond to this claim. On 
the contrary, I think that its answer is more consistent than other possible replies. 
The exclusion principle's response is that religious citizens have nothing to com-
plain about since little of value has been taken from them, as their religious argu-
ments are in fact incoherent. This is the logical endpoint of accepting the exclusion 
principle, but I concede that it strikes me as cold and unresponsive to what inclu-
sionists are trying to say. I have no real solution; all I can recommend is sensitivity 
to the fact that even though religious arguments cannot count as reasons for ac-
tion, they do express something—a belief in a transcendent reality, perhaps. This 
element is lost when we exclude religious arguments. Though I believe this is the 
right solution as a matter of course, there is a true loss here for religious believers. 
Therefore, ways ought to be found to respect this result. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article addresses the old problem of religious argumentation through a 
new framework, inspired by practical reasoning theories. The exclusion principle I 
propose relies on treating each argument as prone to internal change and external 
outweighing by other reasons. As a result, many religious arguments should be 
left out of public debate, but not because they are metaphysically or epistemically 
inferior to other normative theories. Rather, the reason is that such arguments 
resist a true but inconclusive label, and thus become incoherent qua reasons for 
action. This rationale justifies our current practice of excluding religious argu-
ments in legal reasoning, which is hard to explain otherwise. The emerging picture 
is one in which religious argumentation is denied a place in the public sphere, but 
not because of any political or moral defect. 
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